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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A “GET OUT
OF JAIL FREE” CARD FOR STATE
PATENT OWNERS AT THE PTAB?
ANTHONY J. ZUCCHERO & WARREN THOMAS*
The America Invents Acts (“AIA”) introduced new post-grant
proceedings, including the inter partes review (“IPR”), designed to stem the
tide of rising patent litigation costs and address perceived deficiencies in
patent quality.1 IPRs allow third parties to challenge the validity of claims in
an issued patent in view of printed publications and patents.2 Importantly,
the structure of IPRs—including limitations on motion and discovery
practice as well as the statutory mandate that proceedings be conducted
within 12-18 months—dictate that the proceedings are generally shorter and
less expensive than district court proceedings.3 Further, many administrative
patent judges (“APJs”) have technical backgrounds that equip them to
address complicated arguments related to novelty and non-obviousness. 4
Given these advantages, IPRs have become a powerful tool, particularly for
defendants in patent infringement suits.5
Recently, patent owners have invoked state sovereign immunity as a
defense to IPRs before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). The

* Anthony J. (“A.J.”) Zucchero, Ph.D., is a student at Georgia State University College of Law
and a patent agent at Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC in Atlanta, Georgia. Warren Thomas is a principal
at Meunier Carlin & Curfman specializing in inter partes review proceedings and related intellectual
property litigation.
1. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011) (stating that Congress crafted the AIA postgrant proceedings to “establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent
quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs”).
2. Id. at 12.
3. Id.
4. Matias Ferrario, Jennifer Giordano-Coltart & Leslie Grab, The Use of Inter Partes Review
Petitions in ANDA Litigation, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/articles/summer2014-0814-use-interpartes-review-petitions-anda-litigation.html.
5. Matthew Rizzolo, Samuel Brenner, Andrew Sutton & Michael Gershoni, Shielded by
Sovereignty: The Implications for Patentees of Covidien v. University of Florida Research Foundation &
Its Progeny, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 593, 600 (2017).
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PTAB has generally been receptive to states invoking sovereign immunity
to avoid IPRs. However, availability of this defense at the PTAB raises
public policy concerns, particularly in view of recent efforts by private
companies to enter into agreements with Native American tribes to shield
patents from challenge at the PTAB using the related doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity. With the Federal Circuit poised to address the issue of
state sovereign immunity defenses at the PTAB for the first time, the
availability of this defense going forward is uncertain. Accordingly,
practitioners need to be aware of the existing sovereign immunity landscape
and understand how decisions at the appellate level may affect practice
before the PTAB.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Sovereign immunity is a longstanding doctrine under common law that
bars suits against sovereign entities without consent. 6 This principle is
referenced explicitly in the Eleventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution,7 although courts have noted that a state’s sovereign immunity
“neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh
Amendment.”8 Rather, the states’ immunity is a “fundamental aspect” of the
sovereignty they enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution. 9 As
such, a state is generally immune from suit unless (1) the state has waived
its immunity10 or (2) Congress has properly abrogated the state’s immunity.11

6. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13 (1999).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
8. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447–48 (1883) (“The immunity from suit belonging
to a state, which is respected and protected by the constitution within the limits of the judicial power of
the United States, is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure; so that in a suit, otherwise well
brought, in which a state had sufficient interest to entitle it to become a party defendant, its appearance
in a court of the United States would be a voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, while, of course, those
courts are always open to it as a suitor in controversies between it and citizens of other states.”).
11. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“Congress may, in determining what
is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other
contexts.”).
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Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority
Drawing on the broad principles of sovereign immunity reflected in the
Eleventh Amendment, courts have extended the doctrine to many classes of
disputes not enumerated in the Eleventh Amendment. 12 Recently, the
Supreme Court extended sovereign immunity beyond courts to a proceeding
before a federal administrative agency.13 In Federal Maritime Commission
v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, South Carolina Maritime Services
(“SCMS”), a private cruise ship company) filed a complaint with the Federal
Maritime Commission (“FMC”) against the South Carolina State Ports
Authority (“SCSPA”), alleging that the SCSPA’s refusal to provide berthing
space for its ship violated the Shipping Act of 1984.14
SCMS’s complaint was referred to an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) at the FMC to assess whether the SCSPA’s actions violated the
Shipping Act.15 In response, the SCSPA filed a motion to dismiss, asserting
that they are an arm of the State of South Carolina and therefore immune
from proceedings before the ALJ.16 The ALJ agreed with the SCSPA and
dismissed SCMS’s complaint.17 However, the FMC, sua sponte, elected to
review the ALJ’s ruling and reversed the ALJ.18
The SCSPA appealed the Commission’s ruling to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. After reviewing the structure of proceedings
before the ALJ, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the FMC proceeding
“walks, talks, and squawks very much like a lawsuit” and therefore “is truly
an adjudication.”19 Consequently, the court dismissed SCMS’s complaint,
12. Jason Kornmehl, Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota and a New Frontier
for the Waiver by Litigation Conduct Doctrine, 2018 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 7 (2018) (explaining that sovereign
immunity has been extended to protect states from suits brought by classes of plaintiffs not enumerated
in the Eleventh Amendment (e.g., the foreign nations, native American tribes, and the state’s own
citizens) as well as suits in admiralty (as opposed to suits in “law and equity”) and to claims in state
courts).
13. Rizzolo et al., supra note 5, at 607.
14. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747–48 (2002).
15. Id. at 749.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 749–50 (“If federal courts that are established under Article III of the Constitution must
respect States’ 11th Amendment immunity and Congress is powerless to override the States’ immunity
under Article I of the Constitution, it is irrational to argue that an agency like the [Federal Maritime]
Commission, created under an Article I statute, is free to disregard the 11th Amendment or its related
doctrine of State immunity from private suits.”).
18. Id. at 750 (recounting the FMC’s holding that “state sovereign immunity . . . is meant to cover
proceedings before judicial tribunals, whether Federal or state, not executive branch administrative
agencies like the Commission.” (omission in original)).
19. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 243 F.3d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 535 U.S.
743 (2002).
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reasoning that sovereign immunity prevents a state from being compelled to
participate in such an adjudicatory proceeding.20
The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s
decision. To reach its decision, the Court grounded its analysis in the socalled “Hans presumption” 21 and evaluated the structure of proceedings
before the FMC to “determine whether they are the type of proceedings from
which the Framers would have thought the States possessed immunity when
they agreed to enter the Union.” 22 The Court identified a number of
similarities between Article III proceedings and proceedings before the
FMC.23 Given these “overwhelming” similarities, the Supreme Court held
that “state sovereign immunity bars the FMC from adjudicating complaints
filed by a private party against a nonconsenting State.”24
Vas-Cath v. Curators of University of Missouri
Courts have subsequently applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Federal Maritime Commission to proceedings before other administrative
agencies, including the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”). For example, in Vas-Cath v. Curators of University of Missouri,
the Federal Circuit’s reasoning suggested that interference proceedings at the
USPTO are adjudicatory proceedings in which a state may assert sovereign
immunity.25
Vas-Cath stemmed from an interference between Vas-Cath and the
Curators of University of Missouri (“Mizzou”). In this case, the USPTO
granted a patent to Vas-Cath while Mizzou’s earlier filed application directed
to similar technology was undergoing examination.26 Mizzou amended its

20. Id.
21. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 755 (stating that the “Hans presumption” means that “the
Constitution was not intended to ‘rais[e] up’ any proceedings against the States that were ‘anomalous and
unheard of when the Constitution was adopted’” (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890))).
22. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 756.
23. Id. at 756–59. Similarities noted by the Court included (1) Article III judges and ALJs both
possess absolute immunity from suits; (2) Article III judges and ALJs perform similar duties within the
context of the proceedings before them; (3) Article III judges and ALJs both function as “trier[s] of fact
insulated from political influence;” (4) adjudicative proceedings before the FMC employ similar rules
governing pleadings to those found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (5) Article III
proceedings and proceeding before the FMC employ similar discovery and evidentiary rules. Id.
24. Id. at 760.
25. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
26. Id. at 1379.
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application to provoke an interference, and the USPTO ultimately awarded
the disputed claims to Mizzou.27
Vas-Cath appealed the USPTO’s decision to the district court,28 and
Mizzou then moved to dismiss arguing Eleventh Amendment immunity. 29
The district court agreed with Mizzou and dismissed Vas-Cath’s appeal.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court analogized the case to
Federal Maritime Commission and found that “contested interference
proceedings in the PTO bear ‘strong similarities’ to civil litigation” such that
“the administrative proceeding can indeed be characterized as a lawsuit.”30
The Federal Circuit next noted that “a state’s voluntary entry into federal
court serves to waive state immunity from federal adjudication of that
claim.”31 Since Mizzou had “invoked and participated in [the] proceedings
with no claim of immunity,” Mizzou thus waived any potential immunity as
to the interference (including subsequent review in federal court).32 Implicit
in this rationale is the Federal Circuit’s determination that an arm of the state,
such as Mizzou, could also assert sovereign immunity as a defense to an
interference at the USPTO.
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BEFORE THE PTAB
Recently, patent owners have asserted sovereign immunity as a defense
to IPR proceedings before the PTAB. As detailed below, the PTAB has been
willing to extend sovereign immunity to state patent owners in at least some
circumstances.
Covidien LP v. University of Florida Research Foundation, Inc.
Sovereign immunity was first raised before the PTAB in Covidien LP
v. University of Florida Research Foundation, Inc.33 The underlying dispute
relates to a license agreement between Covidien and the University of
Florida Research Foundation (“UFRF”) for rights under U.S. Patent No.

27. Id. at 1379–80.
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 146.
29. Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1379–80.
30. Id. at 1382.
31. Id. at 1383.
32. Id. at 1382, 1385.
33. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, -01275, and -01276
(P.T.A.B. filed June 28, 2016).
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7,062,251 (“the ‘251 patent”).34 After a dispute regarding the payment of
royalties, UFRF sued Covidien for breach of contract in Florida state court
seeking specific performance of an audit provision in the license
agreement.35 Covidien counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that it did
not infringe the ‘251 patent and removed the suit to the United State District
Court for the Northern District of Florida.36 Subsequently, the district court
found that UFRF was entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to the
counterclaim and remanded the suit back to state court for consideration of
UFRF’s contract claim.37
Covidien filed three petitions seeking IPR of the ‘251 patent. UFRF
responded by filing a motion to dismiss the IPRs on the grounds of sovereign
immunity. In its motion, UFRF cited Federal Maritime Commission and
argued that IPR proceedings are adjudicatory proceedings similar in
structure to Article III court proceedings.38 Further, UFRF argued that it had
not waived sovereign immunity because Covidien initiated all proceedings
related to the ‘251 patent, both in federal district court and before the
PTAB.39
In response, Covidien argued that sovereign immunity does nor bar IPR
proceedings.40 First, Covidien argued that patents are “a public right subject
to any and all statutory conditions,” including post-grant proceedings such
as IPRs. 41 As such, Covidien argued that a post-grant proceeding can be
conducted against any patent, regardless of the identity of the patent owner.
Next, Covidien argued that sovereign immunity only applies to “suits
or adjudications ‘commenced or prosecuted against’ [a] state.”42 Conversely,
Covidien contended that IPRs are in rem proceedings directed against a
patent itself.43 To support this position, Covidien cited the language of 35

34. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, Paper 12 at 1. (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 14, 2016).
35. Id.
36. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc. v. Medtronic PLC, No. 1:16CV183-MW/GRJ, 2016 WL
3869877 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2016) (granting plaintiff’s motion to remand after removal).
37. Univ. of Fla., 2016 WL 3869877, at *6.
38. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., IPR2016-01274, Paper 12 at 4–11 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 14, 2016).
39. Id. at 18–20 (arguing that the Florida state court breach of contract action did not implicate
waiver before any federal tribunal).
40. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., IPR2016-01274, Paper 15 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Sept.
28, 2016).
41. Id. at 3.
42. Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).
43. Id.
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U.S.C. § 311, which refers to an IPR as a review of “a patent” rather than a
proceeding against a patent owner.44 Covidien disputed the characterization
of an IPR as a dispute between parties based on the USPTO’s ability to
continue an IPR without any third-party petitioner.45 Thus, because an IPR
is not a suit “commenced or prosecuted against” a patent owner by a
petitioner, Covidien contended that sovereign immunity could not apply.
Third, Covidien argued that significant differences between IPR
proceedings and Article III judicial proceedings render sovereign immunity
inapplicable.46 Covidien noted that in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v.
Lee, 47 the Supreme Court determined that IPRs are “not quasi-judicial
proceedings” but instead “specialized agency proceedings” that differ from
Article III civil suits.48 Covidien then cited numerous differences between
IPR proceedings and Article III suits to argue that these differences should
be sufficient to distinguish from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Federal
Maritime Commission .49
Finally, Covidien argued that sovereign immunity should not be
available before the PTAB for public policy reasons. It contended that
shielding patents from post-grant proceedings would erode patent quality by
preserving patents “that should not have issued in the first place.”50 Further,
Covidien argued that permitting sovereign immunity could undermine a
stated goal of IPRs: to curb the activity of non-practicing entities (“NPEs”).
If sovereign immunity is an available defense in AIA post-grant proceedings,
Covidien argued, then NPEs could enter into arrangements with state
universities to shield their patents from challenge. This would leave parties
targeted by NPEs in the same position they were in before passage of the
AIA.
In January 2017, the PTAB granted UFRF’s motion to dismiss.
Grounding its analysis in Federal Maritime Commission, the PTAB
reviewed the structure of IPRs in detail and noted numerous similarities

44. Id. at 6.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 10–11.
47. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
48. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, Paper 15 at 11 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 28, 2016).
49. Id. at 11–15. Differences cited by Covidien included (1) available remedies; (2) requirements
regarding personal jurisdiction; (3) requirements regarding standing; (4) the ability to amend patent
claims during the proceeding; (5) the breadth of discovery; and (6) applicable standards of proof. Id.
50. Id. at 16.
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between IPR proceedings and Article III judicial proceedings.51 The PTAB
explained that while some differences do exist, these differences are
generally a matter of degree and reflect Congress’s desire to “establish a
more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality
and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”52 Therefore,
the PTAB concluded that IPRs are sufficiently similar to Article III
proceedings to implicate sovereign immunity.53
The PTAB also rejected the additional arguments raised by Covidien.
Regarding Covidien’s argument that a patent is a public right taken subject
to statutory conditions, the PTAB concluded that there is no public rights
exception to a state’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 54 The
PTAB also dismissed Covidien’s argument that IPRs are in rem proceedings.
At the outset, the PTAB noted that the very name of the proceeding (i.e., an
inter partes review) implicates a proceeding between two parties over which
the PTAB has jurisdiction.55 Likewise, other aspects of the IPR proceedings,
such as the requirements for service of process and estoppel provisions
designed to prevent patent owners from successive attacks, support the
notion that an IPR is fundamentally an adjudication between two parties.56
Finally, as to Covidien’s public policy concerns, the PTAB conceded
that sovereign immunity could be used to shield patents from post-grant
challenges. 57 But it reasoned that any such conflict with the statutory
purposes of the AIA might be remedied by Congress itself, which may act to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.58 The PTAB found nothing in the AIA,
however, to suggest Congress had already done so. The PTAB also found no
51. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, Paper 21 at 17–24
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). The PTAB noted the (1) similar roles of district court judges and PTAB judges
during proceedings; (2) similar rules and procedures governing IPR proceedings and Article III judicial
proceedings; (3) the availability of at least some discovery; and (4) the availability and nature of
protective orders. Id.
52. Id. at 20 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39 (2011)).
53. Id. at 25 (“On the whole, considering the nature of inter partes review and civil litigation, we
conclude that the considerable resemblance between the two is sufficient to implicate the immunity
afforded to the States by the Eleventh Amendment. Although there are distinctions, such as in the scope
of discovery, we observe that there is no requirement that the two types of proceedings be identical for
sovereign immunity to apply to an administrative proceeding. Further, we note that there are several
similarities between civil litigation and inter partes review that are not unlike those compared in VasCath for interferences.”).
54. Id. at 11 (noting, among other things, that Covidien failed to cite any authority to support the
proposition that a state’s immunity may be abrogated by a public rights exception).
55. Id. at 13.
56. Id. at 13–15.
57. Id. at 26.
58. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)).
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indication that NPEs (or others) would exploit sovereign immunity to harm
the patent system, much less that such activity would rise to a level to warrant
stripping states of their sovereign immunity.59
Upon entry of the PTAB’s order, Covidien’s three IPRs were dismissed.
Further, as 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) states that a decision to institute (or not
institute) an IPR is “final and nonappealable,” Covidien was (at least at first
glance) unable to appeal the PTAB’s decision.60 While the PTAB’s decision
in Covidien was not designated as precedential and therefore is non-binding
on other panels, the PTAB has adopted the rationale from Covidien in all
subsequent cases related to state sovereign immunity.
NeoChord, Inc. v. University of Maryland, Baltimore
In the wake of the PTAB’s decision in Covidien, University of
Maryland, Baltimore (“UMB”) sought to dismiss a pending IPR filed by
NeoChord, Inc. on the grounds of sovereign immunity.61 This case presented
two additional issues for the PTAB to consider relative to Covidien:
(1) whether UMB’s license of the patent at issue to a non-state entity affected
UMB’s claim of sovereign immunity; and (2) whether UMB’s voluntary
participation in the IPR waived sovereign immunity.
With respect to the first issue, UMB conceded that the challenged patent
was exclusively licensed to a non-state entity (Harpoon Medical, Inc.). 62
However, UMB argued that it retained substantial rights to the patent under

59. Id. at 27.
60. In Cuozzo, the Supreme Court addressed 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). In doing so, the Court noted that
there is a strong presumption in favor of appellate review. Thus, while the Court in Cuozzo held that
decisions regarding institution are generally not reviewable, the Court noted that circumstances might
arise where an institution decision could be reviewed by an appellate court, such as where the decision
implicates a Constitutional issue. See CuozzoSpeed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016).
Therefore, while the plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) would suggest that Covidien could not have
appealed the PTAB’s decision to dismiss Covidien’s IPRs, Covidien arguably could have appealed the
PTAB’s decision to the Federal Circuit without running afoul of the Supreme Court’s precedent in
Cuozzo.
61. NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Baltimore, No. IPR2016-00208, Paper 24 at 1–2 (P.T.A.B. Feb.
23, 2017).
62. Id. at 4.
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the license agreement.63 Further, UMB noted that its license agreement with
Harpoon expressly reserves UMB’s right to assert sovereign immunity.64
However, NeoChord argued that UMB expressly waived sovereign
immunity with respect to USPTO proceedings in its license agreement by
agreeing to use USPTO reexamination and reissue proceedings to resolve
any “Patent Challenge”—disputes regarding the validity and enforceability
of the patent at issue—first, before initiating any other type of proceeding
(e.g., a declaratory judgment action).65 NeoChord argued that this language
consented to jurisdiction at the USPTO and that in analogous circumstances
where a license agreement includes an agreement to federal district court
jurisdiction, courts have considered this a waiver of sovereign immunity.66
NeoChord also argued that UMB waived sovereign immunity through
its voluntary participation in the IPR for more than one year.67 Specifically,
NeoChord argued that courts had rejected belated claims of sovereign
immunity68 and that UMB had failed to meet its burden to establish “why its
belated attempt to raise [sovereign immunity] and introduce evidence that
could have been introduced earlier should be excused.” 69 NeoChord also
noted that during its participation in the IPR, UMB repeatedly requested that
the PTAB exercise authority of the IPR proceeding.70
In May 2017, the PTAB granted UMB’s motion to dismiss on the
grounds of sovereign immunity.71 The panel undertook its own analysis of
63. Id. at 5–6. Rights retained by UMB under the license agreement include (1) the right to practice
the ‘386 patent; (2) the right to license the ‘386 patent to government agencies, universities, educational
institutions, and non-profits for non-commercial purposes; (3) the right to publish scientific findings
related to the ‘386 patent; (4) the right to pass-through royalties on sub-licenses granted by Harpoon
Medical; (5) the right to share in any recovery in an action for infringement of the’386 patent; (6) the
right to pre-approve any settlement or action that materially limits the scope, validity, or enforceability
of the ‘386 patent; (7) the right to enforce the ‘386 patent should Harpoon Medical decline to do so; and
(8) the right to respond to legal actions related to the’386 patent should Harpoon fail to respond. Id.
64. Id. at 6. Section 14.6 of UMB’s license agreement with Harpoon Medical states: “[n]o provision
of this Agreement shall constitute or be construed as a limitation, abrogation, or waiver of any defense or
limitation of liability available to the State of Maryland or its units . . . including without limitation the
defense of sovereign immunity or any other governmental immunity.” Id.
65. NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Baltimore, No. IPR2016-00208, Paper 25 at 6 (P.T.A.B. Mar.
2, 2017) (referencing Section 3.7 of the license agreement).
66. Id. at 17.
67. Id. at 1.
68. See, e.g., Hill v. Blind Ind. & Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d. 754, 757–58 (9th Cir. 1999).
69. NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Baltimore, No. IPR2016-00208, Paper 25 at 4–5 (P.T.A.B.
Mar. 2, 2017).
70. Id. at 5 (citing the patent owner’s “request[]that the Board issue a Final Decision confirming the
patentability of challenged claims 1-23 of the ‘386 patent.”).
71. NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Baltimore, No. IPR2016-00208, Paper 28 at 2 (P.T.A.B. May
23, 2017).
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applicable caselaw, including Federal Maritime Commission and Vas-Cath,
and again concluded that sovereign immunity is available as a defense to IPR
proceedings.72
Next, the PTAB disagreed that UMB waived its immunity through
participation in the IPR. It found that no time limit exists for asserting
sovereign immunity,73 and it noted that courts have held that participation in
a judicial proceeding does not constitute waiver absent a state’s affirmative
action to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.74
The PTAB also found that UMB’s license agreement did not waive or
otherwise vitiate its sovereign immunity defense. Specifically, the PTAB
held that the license only operates as a waiver with respect to Harpoon.75
Further, the PTAB found that UMB retained significant rights under the
license with Harpoon so that UMB was an indispensable party. Thus, the IPR
could not proceed without UMB’s participation and must be terminated.76
While again not designated precedential, the NeoChord decision
reinforced the PTAB’s reasoning in Covidien and effectively extended
sovereign immunity to non-state licensees of state-owned patents, provided
that the state retains at least some rights under the license agreement.
Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp.
The PTAB next addressed sovereign immunity in Reactive Surfaces
Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp.77 The underlying dispute relates to an IPR
filed by Reactive Surfaces Ltd. requesting review of a patent that is coowned by Toyota and the Regents of the University of Minnesota
(“Minnesota”).78 Toyota and Minnesota filed a joint motion to dismiss that
reiterated the PTAB’s rationale from Covidien.79 Toyota and Minnesota then
addressed whether the proceeding could continue without Minnesota’s
participation.

72. Id. at 4–7.
73. Id. at 14 (citing Fla. Dep’t of St. v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683 (1982)).
74. Id. at 14–15.
75. Id. at 17–18.
76. Id. at 19.
77. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp, No. IPR2016-01914, Paper 36 (P.T.A.B.
July 13, 2017).
78. Id. at 2.
79. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp, No. IPR2016-01914, Paper 23 at 2–11
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2017).
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Toyota and Minnesota stated that if Minnesota solely owned the patent,
it would be undisputed that the IPR should be dismissed. 80 Toyota and
Minnesota argued that the situation should be no different in the case of a
co-owned patent because “[a]djudicating the merits of [the IPR] in
[Minnesota’s] absence would violate the State of Minnesota’s immunity no
less than requiring the University to become a party would.”81
However, Reactive Surfaces argued that in all cases where federal
courts have dismissed an action against a non-state patent owner based on
the sovereign immunity of a state co-owner, this dismissal was based on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b). 82 Reactive Surfaces argued that
absent Rule 19(b)—which does not have a counterpart in the AIA trial
rules—there is simply no mechanism to dismiss the IPR.83
Applying the rationale set forth in Covidien and NeoChord, the PTAB
held that Minnesota possessed sovereign immunity and dismissed Minnesota
from the IPR proceeding.84 As the PTAB reasoned, co-owners Toyota and
Minnesota share an identical interest in the patent such that Toyota can
adequately represent Minnesota’s interests. Thus, the PTAB concluded that
the IPR could still proceed without Minnesota’s participation.85
Ericsson v. Regents of University of Minnesota
Ericsson represents the latest proceeding to implicate state sovereign
immunity before the PTAB. The underlying dispute began when Minnesota
sued several telecommunications providers who allegedly purchased
infringing network components from Ericsson.86 Ericsson intervened in the

80. Id. at 11. Reactive Surfaces, like Covidien and NeoChord, argued that IPRs are not suits against
a state (but rather are in rem proceedings) and that IPR proceedings are dissimilar enough from civil suits
such that sovereign immunity should not apply. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No.
IPR2016-01914, Paper 25 at 8–17 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 2017). However, this argument was found
unpersuasive by the PTAB. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp, No. IPR2016-01914,
Paper 36 at 4 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017).
81. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, Paper 23 at 11
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2017).
82. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, Paper 25 at 19
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 2017).
83. Id. at 19–20.
84. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, Paper 36 at 11
(P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017).
85. Id. at 15–17.
86. Kornmehl, supra note 12, at 10.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (DO NOT DELETE)

88

CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.| PTAB BAR ASSOCIATION

5/21/2019 7:00 PM

Vol 18:4

suit and thereafter filed a series of petitions requesting IPR of Minnesota’s
patents.87
Ericsson proactively raised the issue of sovereign immunity in its
petitions and argued that Minnesota waived any sovereign immunity it might
possess by asserting the patents in district court. 88 Specifically, Ericsson
compared IPRs to a federal court’s compulsory counterclaim and argued that
Minnesota had effectively “consented to jurisdiction in the PTAB” where it
“could ‘surely anticipate’ . . . invalidity claims before the PTAB.”89
As expected, Minnesota filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
sovereign immunity. Minnesota argued that a waiver of sovereign immunity
resulting from an infringement suit extends only to compulsory
counterclaims in the same action and forum.90 Further, Minnesota argued
that Ericsson’s contention that filing suit in one forum should constitute
waiver in a separate forum is contrary to established precedent.91 Finally,
Minnesota attacked Ericsson’s effort to analogize the IPRs to counterclaims,
noting that counterclaims by definition must be presented in district court
pleadings and must be able to be resolved within the same suit as the original
claim.92
The PTAB denied Minnesota’s motion to dismiss. In its decision, the
PTAB adopted the rationale of the Covidien panel, but it held that Minnesota
waived its immunity by filing suit for patent infringement in district court.93
The PTAB acknowledged that a waiver of sovereign immunity does not
necessarily extend to a separate action, but the PTAB argued that no “brightline rule” prohibits such a waiver from applying. 94 Rather, the PTAB
explained that the extent of a state’s waiver is a judgment based on the desire
to avoid “unfairness and inconsistency.”95 Because a suit in federal court
triggers the one-year bar for a defendant to petition for IPR, the PTAB
87. Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, -01197, -01200, -01213, 01214, and -01219 (P.T.A.B. filed Mar. 28, 2017).
88. Kornmehl, supra note 12, at 10.
89. Rizzolo, supra note 5, at 630.
90. Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, Paper 8 at 12 (P.T.A.B. June
21, 2017) (citing Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
91. Id. (citing Tegic Commc’ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335 (Fed.
Cir. 2006), in which the Federal Circuit held that Texas’s filing of an infringement suit in Texas did not
waive sovereign immunity with respect to a defendant’s supplier’s declaratory judgment action for
invalidity in Washington).
92. Id. at 15.
93. Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, Paper 14 at 4 (P.T.A.B. Dec.
19, 2017).
94. Id. at 7.
95. Id.
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reasoned that a patent owner would reasonably expect the defendant to file
an IPR petition in response to such a suit.96 The PTAB concluded that “[i]t
would be unfair and inconsistent to allow a State to avail itself of the federal
government’s authority by filing a patent infringement action in federal
court, but then selectively invoke its sovereign immunity to ensure that a
defendant is barred from requesting an inter partes review of the asserted
patent from a different branch of that same federal government.”97
On this basis, the PTAB denied Minnesota’s motion to dismiss on the
grounds of sovereign immunity. Minnesota has appealed the PTAB’s
decision to the Federal Circuit, and oral arguments were held on March 19,
2019.98 Therefore, the Federal Circuit will soon have its first opportunity to
directly address state sovereign immunity before the PTAB.
LANDSCAPE AT THE PTAB IN THE WAKE OF THESE CASES
Absent a decision from either the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court,
state patent owners will likely continue to enjoy sovereign immunity from
post-grant proceedings in the wake of the PTAB’s decisions discussed
above, provided that (1) the patent at issue is not co-owned by a non-state
entity and (2) the state has not previously asserted the patent at issue against
the petitioner in district court.
Since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980,99 universities have
increasingly amassed large patent portfolios.100 Many of these universities
(as well as their associated research foundations) are public universities that
qualify as arms of their respective state governments.101 As such, these state
universities’ patent portfolios enjoy immunity from challenges before the
PTAB and before district courts in declaratory judgment actions. 102
Consequently, third parties—including licensees, potential licensees, and
potential infringers—currently have limited options to challenge the validity

96. Id. at 8.
97. Id. at 8–9.
98. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., No. 2018-1559 (Fed. Cir. filed Feb. 18, 2018).
99. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2012).
100. Rizzolo, supra note 5, at 632–34.
101. See, e.g., Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc. v. Medtronic PLC, No. 1:16CV183-MW/GRJ, 2016
WL 3869877, at *6 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2016) (holding that the University of Florida Research Foundation
is an arm of the State of Florida and therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from a
declaratory judgment suit in federal court).
102. See, e.g., id.; Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc., IPR2016-01274, Paper 21 at 3
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (holding that “UFRF, as an arm of the State of Florida, is entitled to a sovereign
immunity defense to the institution of an inter partes review”).
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of state university-owned patents preemptively. Should this continue to be
the case, state universities may gain added leverage in negotiations with
licensees, potential licensees, and infringers. Likewise, licensees of stateowned patents may be free to adopt a more aggressive posture towards
competitors. However, this safe harbor may be short-lived.
Recently, the Federal Circuit held that the related doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity could not be asserted as a defense to an IPR.103 While
acknowledging that tribal sovereign immunity differs in certain respects
from state sovereign immunity, the court suggested that the framework in
Federal Maritime Commission is illustrative for purposes of assessing tribal
sovereign immunity.104 Noting distinctions between IPRs and civil suits in
federal district court, the Federal Circuit determined that IPRs are “agency
proceedings” that are both “functionally and procedurally different” than
district court litigation.105 On this basis, the Federal Circuit held that tribal
sovereign immunity could not be asserted as a defense to an IPR. Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari review, but the
Supreme Court denied the petition.106
Now that the Supreme Court has let the ruling in Saint Regis stand, the
Federal Circuit’s analysis of IPR’s under the Federal Maritime Commission
framework could lead the PTAB to reevaluate its view of state sovereign
immunity going forward. In addition, assuming the Federal Circuit applies
the reasoning from Saint Regis to Minnesota’s pending appeal of Ericsson,
the Federal Circuit appears likely to strike down state sovereign immunity as
a defense to IPR proceedings later this year. However, practitioners may
ultimately have to wait for clarity from the Supreme Court.

103. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
104. Id. at 1326.
105. Id. at 1329. The Federal Circuit further noted that the Supreme Court has likewise characterized
as “specialized agency proceedings” as opposed to quasi-judicial proceedings. Id. at 1326 (citing Cuozzo,
136 S. Ct. at 2143–44).
106. Order Denying Certiorari, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 18-899, 2019
WL 1590253 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019).

